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I. INTRODUCTION
Determination of contract damages is ultimately a question of
policy-a statement of the objectives our society is attempting to
achieve through its legal system. Before the subject of damages can
be reduced to a system of rules, it is important to understand the
principles, the reasons for the rules.1 In a seminal 1937 article, L.
L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr. identified three interests
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Montana School of Law. B.A., Williams
College, 1968; J.D., New York University, 1974; LL.M., New York University, 1981.
Researchers into Montana contract law are deeply indebted to the compilers of MON-
TANA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1940), prepared by the
faculty of the School of Law under the auspices of the Montana Bar Association. The inter-
vening years have seen the publication of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
Occasional footnotes indicate the location of the topic in the ANNOTATIONS (and thus in the
RESTATEMENT) and in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND).
1. Surveys of contract damages include Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937); Wright, The Law of Rem-
edies as a Social Institution, 18 U. Dgr. L.J. 376 (1955); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLuM. L. REV. 1145 (1970); Burrows, Contract, Tort and Restitu-
tion-A Satisfactory Division or Not?, 99 L. Q. REV. 217 (1983).
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served by judicial remedies for breach of contract: expectancy, reli-
ance, and restitution.2 Their influence may be seen in section 344
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which expressly recog-
nized the three interests:
§344. Purposes of Remedies
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement
serve to protect one or more of the following interests of a
promisee:
(a) his "expectation interest," which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a
position as he would -have been in had the contract been
performed,
(b) his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract not been made, or
(c) his "restitution interest," which is his interest in
having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on
the other party.
The three interests are illustrated by the following example. A
agrees to build a house for B for $50,000, of which $5000 represents
A's profit. If B breaches before any performance by A, A's only
remedy is the expectation interest, $5000. If B breaches after A has
expended $30,000, A's reliance interest is $30,000 and A's expecta-
tion interest is $35,000. If A has conferred on B a benefit worth
$36,000, A's restitution interest is $36,000.'
Within the area of contract damages, these interests fre-
quently overlap. For example, computation of the expectation and
restitution interests may include expenses incurred or benefits con-
ferred in reliance on the agreement.' And reliance may provide an
2. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1.
3. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 814-15 (1982). Application of these concepts
outside of the commercial area is particularly difficult. Those who began law school with
Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929), the case of the "hairy hand," will sym-
pathize with the modern student who begins with Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 296
N.E.2d 183 (1973). In Sullivan, plaintiff was promised a "Hedy Lamarr" nose by defendant
doctor and received a nose more bulbous than her pre-operative nose. In applying these
concepts, the court had to decide whether plaintiff was entitled to:
(a) the expectation interest: the value of the difference between what she was
promised (a Hedy Lamarr nose) and what she got (the post-operative nose); or
(b) the reliance interest: the value which would restore her from where she
stood after performance (the post-operative nose) to where she stood prior to per-
formance (the pre-operative nose); or
(c) the restitution interest: the value which she conferred on defendant (the
cost of the operation).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38 & 159-67. Corbin does not recognize reli-
[Vol. 45
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alternative basis for the enforcement of a promise where considera-
tion is lacking.5 More significantly, the interests in contract actions
overlap with the interests served by the other two branches of the
law of obligations, tort and restitution." Reliance, in serving the
injured party's interest in being restored to the status quo, per-
forms the same function in tort actions.7 And restitution, in serv-
ing the injured party's interest in recovering benefits unjustly re-
tained, performs the same function in actions based on unjust
enrichment.8
A previous article examined Montana statutes and case law in
the area of expectancy damages with a view toward determining
the flexibility with which courts apply the available remedies and
whether the remedies serve the desired ends.9 This article makes a
similar examination in the areas of reliance and restitution, but the
inquiry is not limited to damages for breach of contract. Remedies
serving the expectation interest are available only in a contract
claim. But remedies serving the restitution and reliance interests
may be available in the absence of an enforceable agreement.
This article explores those interests not only in claims arising
from breach of contract, but also in claims involving non-contrac-
tual voluntary obligations.'0 For example, reliance may be available
ance as a separate interest. Rather, he identifies the classes of remedies as (1) damages, (2)
restitution, and (3) specific performance. He views damages as satisfying the expectation
interest and restitution as satisfying both the reliance and restitution interests, for both
restore plaintiff to the status quo. 5 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORK-
ING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 990 (1964) [hereinafter cited as A. CORBIN, CoNrRACTS].
This article will follow the distinction made by Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, that
reliance encompasses all expenses in performance or preparation for performance while res-
titution includes only performance conferred on the other party.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 49-62.
6. Burrows, supra note 1.
7. Id. at 254.
8. Id.
9. Burnham, Contract Damages in Montana Part I: Expectancy Damages, 44 MoNT.
L. REV. 1 (1983).
10. While beyond the scope of this article, controversy is growing over the wavering
barrier between tort and contract. See, e.g., Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64
MARQ. L. REV. 425 (1981); Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Con-
tract-Inductions From A Study Of Commercial Good Faith In First-Party Insurance
Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330 (1980); Louderback, Standards for Limiting the Tort of
Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 187 (1982).
The Montana Supreme Court will undoubtedly soon face the issue outside the insur-
ance area, where statutory limitations apply. See, e.g., Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett &
Weaver v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 91 F.R.D. 284 (D. Mont. 1981) (delay in
payment of attorneys' fees as independent tort); Whalen v. Snell, - Mont. - , 667 P.2d
436 (1983) (nonpayment of attorneys' fees as tort claim).
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when plaintiff seeks damages (1) for breach of contract" or (2) for
having been induced to change position by a promise of defen-
dant."2 And restitution may be available when plaintiff seeks dam-
ages (1) for breach of contract's or for benefits conferred, (2) where
there has been no contract," (3) where there was a contract but
defendant's performance has been discharged,' 5 (4) where plaintiff
is in breach,' 6 or (5) where the contract is voided for illegality. 7
Courts are fond of repeating the shibboleth that for every
wrong there is a remedy.' 8 There are many remedies available to
protect the interests of an injured party, including money damages
and specific performance.19 Ironically, the very flexibility of the
remedies and the duplication of the remedies among the various
branches of the law often promote rigidity. For example, statutes
in Montana do not expressly recognize restitution. 0 Within con-
tract, the expectation interest is recognized, but not reliance or res-
titution.2' Restitution as a branch of law and the reliance and res-
titution interests are found in common law, but in dredging up
the common law, courts often scoop up the detritus of the forms of
action ' s and the separation of law and equity.2 ' In pleading, courts
may be concerned with overlapping interests and require an "elec-
tion of remedies. '2 5
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infrE Part III.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infrE Part V.
16. See infra Part VII.
17. See infrE Part VIII.
18. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 1-3-214 (1983). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 345 comment a (1981); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 990.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981). Other remedies may in-
clude reformation, declaratory judgment, and enforcement of an arbitration award. The
remedy of specific performance is beyond the scope of this article.
20. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-202, -317 (1983).
21. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1983).
22. Restitution is not defined in the statutes or cases. Moreover, there are no West key
numbers for "Reliance" or "Restitution," leading the researcher to search for the concepts
across a multitude of topics where they might be applied.
23. See, e.g., Puetz v. Carlson, 139 Mont. 373, 364 P.2d 742 (1961). Corbin comments
dryly, "It looks as if the lawyers in the case must have reverted back to the days of common
law pleading and forms of action." 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1102 n.1. One is reminded of
the famous statement: "The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their
graves." F. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Madison Fork Ranch v. L & B Lodge Pole Timber Products, - Mont.
__ 615 P.2d 900, 906 (1980) (distinction between rescission at law and rescission in eq-
uity). This practice is especially unproductive with respect to restitution, for the remedy
was available at both law and equity. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 990.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 157-67.
[Vol. 45
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In deciding a particular case, a court often becomes entangled
in statutory mandates, the common law tradition, and the embodi-
ment of claims in pleadings, and loses sight of principle, the reason
for the rules. The basic principle of damages, to compensate for
injury done, can usually be found when the entanglements are
cleared away.2
II. RELIANCE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
While the paramount interest in contract damages is the ex-
pectation interest, the other interests should be given wider recog-
nition.2 7 Fuller and Perdue concluded from their 1936-37 examina-
tion of the three interests that the reliance interest should be
rescued from neglect.2 8 They pointed out that the original Restate-
ment of Contracts virtually ignored the reliance interest.29 Even
the now-famous section 90, which recognized the possibility of re-
covery on a promise in the absence of a bargained-for considera-
tion, treated the promisee's reasonable reliance as creating an
agreement for the breach of which expectancy damages would be
available.30 Their position won the day with legal scholars, for the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts organized the chapter on reme-
dies on the basis of the three interests"1 and added a new sentence
to section 90: "The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
26. See Wright, supra note 1.
27. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 1147-49.
28. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 56-67, 418-20.
The neglect of reliance in legal thinking is curious in light of the fact that the reliance
interest is easier to justify philosophically than the expectation. The restitution interest is
easiest of all to justify and, perhaps for that reason, had been accepted earlier historically.
The restitution interest is protected by awarding damages when plaintiff has conferred a
benefit on defendant which it would be unjust for defendant to keep. Plaintiff has been
injured to the same extent that defendant has been enriched. Restitution damages restore
the balance, serving the distributive aspect of the system of damages.
The reliance interest is protected by awarding damages when plaintiff has changed po-
sition in reliance on the promise of defendant. This differs from the restitution interest in
that plaintiff may have conferred benefits not on defendant but on third parties. Reliance
damages restore plaintiff at the expense of defendant, introducing a corrective and perhaps
deterrent aspect to the system of damages. While damages based on reliance restore plain-
tiff to a previous position and damages based on restitution restore defendant to a previous
position, damages based on the expectation give plaintiff something neither party ever had,
the "benefit of the bargain." Although commentators have pointed out that parties to a
contract are equally free to perform or not to perform, expectation damages probably reflect
economic necessity: society will function better if promises are performed and to this end
sanctions will be imposed on non-performance.
29. Id. at 89-96. See MONTANA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 333 (1940) [hereinafter cited as ANNOTATIONS]; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 349 (1981).
30. See infra note 49.
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16 (1981).
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justice requires. '3 2 The appropriate remedy may be restitution or
reliance damages.33
Courts, however, have been slower to identify the reliance in-
terest, perhaps because plaintiffs rarely seek reliance damages in-
dependent of the expectancy. For example, if A agrees to build a
house for B for $50,000 of which $5000 represents A's profit and B
breaches when half finished, A is entitled to damages of $27,500,
(the cost of performance plus the entire profit). This can be com-
puted either as expectancy damages of $5000 plus reliance dam-
ages of $22,500, or as expectancy damages of $27,500 (the amount
required to put A in as good a position as A would have been in
had the contract been performed).
It is important for a court to distinguish between the reliance
expenses in performing the agreement and reliance expenses in col-
lateral transactions, lest it include reliance damages in the expec-
tancy or exclude reliance expenses that are separate from the ex-
pectancy.3 ' For example, in Smith v. Fergus County, 6 plaintiff
alleged defendant breached an agreement to lease him farmland.
Plaintiff claimed as damages the expense of regaining possession,
the expense of preparing farm machinery to work the land, and
lost profits. In dicta, the court s6 correctly stated that the expense
of regaining possession was recoverable in addition to the expec-
tancy, for this was a foreseeable consequence of the breach. 7
But the court would have denied the expense of preparation,
for this expense would have been incurred in order to earn the
profit.3 8 The court failed to think through the consequences of this
proposition. It correctly stated that plaintiff was entitled to recover
net profit, which is the profits less all the expenses that would have
been incurred. But if a court equates hypothetical expenses with
actual expenses, plaintiff will not recover the expectancy when net
profit is awarded. This would be like awarding the contractor in
the previous example only the net profit of $5000 irrespective of
how much the contractor had expended in performance. 9
32. Id. § 90.
33. Id. § 90 comment d. See infra note 49.
34. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 78 categorized expenditures in preparing for and
performing the agreement as "essential" reliance and expenditures in preparing for collat-
eral transactions as "incidental" reliance.
35. 98 Mont. 377, 39 P.2d 193 (1934).
36. Unless otherwise indicated, "the court" means the Supreme Court of Montana.
37. Smith, 98 Mont. at 385, 39 P.2d at 195.
38. Id.
39. A correct application of the court's principle may be found in Wyatt v. School
Dist. No. 104, 148 Mont. 83, 417 P.2d 221 (1966). In awarding a teacher the salary lost when
the school board terminated her contract, the court denied her moving expense, which she
[Vol. 45
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The court in Smith recognized the possibility of a remedy
based on the reliance interest alone when it stated that "[t]he ex-
pense incurred would have been a proper item of damages, had the
plaintiff not sought to recover the net profits anticipated from pro-
spective farming operations .... "o40 Damages for reliance alone are
likely to be sought where plaintiff is unable to prove lost profits
and where the benefit was not conferred on defendant, thus ruling
out expectancy and restitution damages. 1 When this occurs, a
court will not allow plaintiff's reliance damages to exceed what
plaintiff would have recovered for full performance. Thus defen-
dant may generally prove that the agreement would have been a
losing one to limit the expectancy and therefore the reliance dam-
ages as well. 4 2
In Wiseman v. Holt," the court approved the recovery of reli-
ance expenses which exceeded the expectancy in order to prevent
the non-breaching party from losing money on the bargain. The
case involved breach of an agreement to purchase real property, for
which the statutory damages are the excess of the contract price
over the value of the property.44 Under a literal reading of the stat-
ute, if purchaser breached an agreement to buy property at its
market price, seller would be unable to recover expenses incurred
in reliance on the sale. The California Supreme Court had rejected
the literal reading of an identical statute.45 The court approved of
this interpretation in Wiseman, holding that reliance damages
were permissible to compensate the non-breaching party under
general principles of damages.4 '
would have incurred even if defendant had performed. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 21.
Wyatt may be distinguished from Smith in that the lost salary is a gross loss while the lost
profit on the crop is a net loss.
40. Smith, 98 Mont. at 385, 39 P.2d at 195.
41. The classic example is Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542
(1932), in which a fight promoter unable to prove profits with certainty sought expenses
incurred. Reliance damages may also be awarded where the agreement is unenforceable. See
infra text accompanying notes 115-27.
42. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 1, at 79 stated that "[w]e will not in a suit for reim-
bursement of losses incurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better
position than he would have occupied had the contract been fully performed," but the "sim-
ple formula" does not do justice to their exposition on the subject at 75-80.
43. 163 Mont. 387, 517 P.2d 711 (1973).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-315 (1983) provides:
The detriment caused by the breach of an agreement to purchase an estate in real
property is deemed to be the excess, if any, of the amount which would have been
due to the seller under the contract over the value of the property to him.
45. Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 (1951).
46. Wiseman, 163 Mont. at 391-92, 517 P.2d at 714. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311
(1983) provides:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages,
1984]
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Wiseman is an excellent illustration of the statutory neglect of
reliance damages and the court's salutory recognition of broad
principle. Regrettably, Wiseman was overruled in Whitney v.
Bails. 47 In Whitney, the court held that what is now section 27-1-
315 of the Montana Code Annotated is the exclusive measure of
damages for breach of an agreement to purchase real property. 48
The court adopted the ruling in the course of overruling the broad
exception to the statute under the facts of Wiseman. It is possible
that a narrow exception, such as that recognized by the California
court, might survive.
III. RELIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRACT
The Restatement of Contracts recognized that promises may
be enforceable even in the absence of bargained-for consideration
if the promisee reasonably relied on the promise and suffered a
detriment. This principle is expressed in section 90 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts:
§ 90. Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
duce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is bind-
ing if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the prom-
ise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice
requires.
Under this section, a promise may be enforced to the extent only
of the reliance interest rather than the expectation interest." The
principle of reliance has had a tremendous impact on the law of
except when otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will
compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment which was proximately
caused thereby or in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result there-
from. Damages which are not clearly ascertainable in both their nature and origin
cannot be recovered for a breach of contract.
47. 172 Mont. 121, 560 P.2d 1344 (1977).
48. Id. at 125, 560 P.2d at 1347. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 31-33.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33. Under the RESTATEMENT rule, the reli-
ance was apparently viewed as consideration. The remedy was therefore all or nothing: the
expectancy if reasonable reliance was found, nothing if it was not. The RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) rule is more flexible, but § 90 comment d persists in stating that the reliance creates a
contract. This does not seem to follow. If there were a contract, expectancy damages would
be available and performance by the promisee could be enforced. For example, A promises
B $5000 toward law school expenses and in reasonable reliance on the promise, B spends
$1500 on tuition. B has undertaken no enforceable obligation. And if A repudiates, B may
enforce A's promise, if at all, only to the extent of $1500. Since these aspects of contractual
obligations are absent, it would seem more accurate to state that § 90 provides for the en-
forcement of promises in the absence of a contract.
[Vol. 45
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contracts since its appearance in the Restatement, yet that impact
has been scarcely felt in Montana."
In Fiers v. Jacobson,"' defendant sold to a third party land
which plaintiff had an option to purchase. When plaintiff at-
tempted to exercise the option, defendant claimed that plaintiff
was estopped by his oral statements that he would not exercise the
option. The court cited Restatement section 90 among many exam-
ples of the doctrine of estoppel.2 The section is generally applied
to estop a promisor from denying that the promise created a legal
obligation when the promise is reasonably acted upon. In Fiers, a
legal obligation had already been created; the issue was whether
the statements modified the existing obligation. 3 The court held
that the statements "were not so definite and certain as to reason-
ably be expected to induce action on the part of the promisee.""
The conclusion presumes that the statements constituted a prom-
ise, but if they were not definite and certain they probably would
not rise to the level of a promise. 5  Therefore the question of rea-
sonable reliance need not have been reached.
The requirement that the statements constitute a promise
before the reliance principle is applicable was correctly analyzed in
Keil v. Glacier Park, Inc." In Keil, plaintiff claimed breach of a
written contract for the rental of a water pump. Defendant alleged
that prior to the written agreement, plaintiff had bound himself
either by an oral agreement or by a promise enforceable under Re-
statement section 90. The court held that the oral discussions were
preliminary negotiations lacking the specific terms necessary to
constitute a promise. Since this element of promissory estoppel
was lacking, the court properly concluded that Restatement sec-
tion 90 was not applicable. 8
Other Montana cases have utilized the concept without citing
50. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 90.
51. 123 Mont. 242, 211 P.2d 968 (1949).
52. Id. at 250, 211 P.2d at 972.
53. The principle of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(c), which applies § 90
to modification of an executory contract, might have been more applicable. But a major
obstacle to modification is the current MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1602 (1983), which provides
that a written agreement may not be altered by an unexecuted oral agreement.
54. Fiers, 123 Mont. at 252-53, 211 P.2d at 973. The court stated that the standard of
proof to be applied in deciding whether the statements provided a basis for reliance was
"clear and convincing." This appears contrary to the statutory standard of a preponderance
of the evidence in all civil cases. MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-403 (1983). See Gehlert v. Quinn,
35 Mont. 451, 90 P. 168 (1907) ("clearly and distinctly proven" instruction held erroneous).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981).
56. - Mont. -, 614 P.2d 502 (1980).
57. Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 507.
58. Id.
1984]
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the Restatement. In Bronken's Good Time Co. v. J. W. Brown &
Associates,59 the court affirmed a conclusion that defendant was
liable for damages for termination of an exclusive distributorship
agreement even though the agreement was terminable at will.o
Applying the "modern majority rule" that "such agreements are
terminable at will only after a lapse of a reasonable time and on
reasonable notice," the court upheld a finding that plaintiff was
entitled to a binding agreement for a reasonable term, here two
years.61 Plaintiff had made a substantial investment in the busi-
ness in reliance on the agreement. Nevertheless, it seems arbitrary
for a trial court to assign a particular term to the agreement and
award expectancy damages for profits lost during that term. In
many such situations there may be no profits. A more appropriate
remedy might be reliance damages to the extent of plaintiff's
investment.2
Restatement (Second) section 90 represents an alternative to
the formalistic bargain theory of consideration. As a policy matter,
courts have increasingly recognized that reliance on an unbar-
gained-for or illusory promise may call for a remedy.6 3 The pos-
sibilities for imaginative use of the doctrine are enormous. For ex-
ample, employees have invoked the doctrine in unsuccessful efforts
to prevent an employer from closing plants after the employer rep-
resented that it would not shut down the plants if employees
worked to keep them profitable."' And the city of Yonkers, New
York sued United Technologies Corporation after the corporation
closed a plant that was constructed with the help of sixteen million
dollars in public funds. 5
IV. RESTITUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONTRACT
As recognized in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
344, restitution is a remedial interest of a contract promisee. In
this context, where it is a source of remedial rights, principles of
59. - Mont. -, 661 P.2d 861 (1983).
60. Id. at -, 661 P.2d at 863.
61. Id. See also Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196 (1968).
62. See, e.g., Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 395 F.2d 388, 391 (8th
Cir. 1968).
63. See the many annotations in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Appendix § 90
(1982).
64. Local 1330, United Steelworkers of America v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1983, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 6.
MIH. COMP. LAWS § 19.831 (1978) provides that a business which receives consideration
from a municipality must restore the consideration on moving or closing.
[Vol. 45
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contract law are paramount. But restitution is also a branch of law
dealing with obligations imposed in the absence of contract. In this
context, where it is a source of primary rights, principles of unjust
enrichment are paramount. In between these contexts are situa-
tions where there has been a contract, but the contractual duties
have been held to be unenforceable, excused, or avoided. In this
context, while restitution is apparently a source of primary rights,
principles of contract law are nevertheless significant. This article
examines restitution in all of these contexts, going from its applica-
tion where there are no antecedent contractual rights, to where the
antecedent rights are no longer applicable, to where the antecedent
rights are served by the restitution interest.66
At common law, general assumpsit developed as the action to
be used where, in the absence of a contract (for which there was
the action of special assumpsit), plaintiff claimed that there was a
debt which defendant ought to pay. The "common counts" in this
action included, among others, goods sold and delivered, money
had and received, and work and labor performed. 7 In Moses v.
Macferlan,6 s Lord Mansfield stated:
[T]his kind of equitable action, to recover money back, which
ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore
much encouraged ....
In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the defen-
dant upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity to refund the money.
Today, the claim is known broadly as restitution,69 more nar-
rowly as quasi-contract or contract implied in law,70 even more
narrowly as quantum meruit or quantum valebant,71 and somewhat
66. See Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. Rsv. 1208 (1973).
67. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 4-10 (1937).
68. 2 Burr. 1007, 1012 (1760).
69. Restitution may include claims for equitable relief such as specific restitution, eq-
uitable lien, and constructive trust, as well as money damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981).
70. The fictions of "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" should be discarded. A
money claim predicated on the restitution interest in the absence of contract is simply a
claim for restitution.
Contract implied in law should not be confused with implied contract. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-103 (1983) provides in relevant part that "[a]n implied contract is one the exis-
tence and terms of which are manifested by conduct," as opposed to an express contract.
See Cartwright v. Joyce, 155 Mont. 478, 484, 473 P.2d 515, 518 (1970) (citing French v.
County of Lewis and Clark, 87 Mont. 448, 455, 288 P. 455, 457 (1930)).
71. Quantum meruit ("as much as he deserves") and quantum valebant ("as much as
they are worth") were specific counts under the common law action of general assumpsit,
used where money was due but where the exact amount was not ascertainable, as was re-
quired in the action for debt. While originally a procedural term, quantum meruit is gener-
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anachronistically as assumpsit7s This article will use the principle
broadly, as stated in section 1 of the Restatement of Restitution:
§ 1 Unjust Enrichment. A person who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the
other.
While the adverb "unjustly" indicates that restitution is not avail-
able to remedy every enrichment, that element should not be
equated with enrichment obtained by unlawful means. Identifica-
tion of the appropriate application of the remedy requires case-by-
case analysis. In fact, this is how the doctrine developed, with
courts granting relief according to a general theory only later dis-
covered by commentators. 3
This process of exploring the parameters of a slippery doctrine
on a case-by-case basis has gone on in Montana.7' In Brown v.
Thornton'7 5 plaintiff supplied building materials to the interven-
ors, whose house was mortgaged to defendants. The intervenors
defaulted and the house was conveyed to defendants. Plaintiff al-
lowed his mechanic's lien to lapse and failed to appear in the inter-
venor's bankruptcy proceedings, in which the debt was discharged.
Plaintiff then sued defendants in restitution for the benefits con-
ferred. The court stated that the equitable doctrine of unjust en-
richment required that plaintiff "show some element of miscon-
duct or fault of some sort on the part of the defendant, or that he
was in some way taken advantage of." 76 While this dictum embod-
ies an overly restrictive view of the availability of restitution, the
court correctly stated that "[the mere fact that defendants were
benefited by plaintiff's materials is not of itself sufficient to require
defendants to make restitution therefor."' 7
As the court recognized, the requirements for a claim for un-
just enrichment lie within the bounds of mere benefit on the one
hand and benefit obtained by misconduct on the other.78 While
ally used for any claim for the return of a benefit conferred on another party in the form of
work, labor, or services. These claims, too, are simply claims for restitution. See 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1102.
72. See Puetz v. Carlson, 139 Mont. 373, 364 P.2d 742 (1961).
73. See Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1959).
74. The doctrine may arise in contexts other than the determination of substantive
rights. In Iowa Mfg. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., - Mont. ___ 669 P.2d 1057 (1983), one of the
issues was the statute of limitations for an indemnity action, which the dissent characterized
as an action based on restitution.
75. 150 Mont. 150, 432 P.2d 386 (1967).
76. Id. at 156, 432 P.2d at 390.
77. Id.
78. See Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv.
1183 (1966). Wade summarizes the restrictions on restitution in this manner:
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plaintiff in Brown did not exemplify the "officious intermeddler"
who confers benefits on unwilling recipients 7 9 defendants' receipt
of the benefit was not "unjust" where defendants had no opportu-
nity to decline the benefit and there was no public policy support-
ing plaintiff's conferring of it.80 As between defendants and inter-
venors, plaintiff's claim against the intervenors was far stronger
and was lost only because of his improvidence.
Failure of the parties conferring the benefit to secure their in-
terests before claiming restitution was a major factor in Business
Finance Co. v. Red Barn Inc.8 Plaintiff leased equipment to de-
fendant which then traded its business to one Palmer. There was
no express agreement between defendant and Palmer regarding
use of the equipment, but when plaintiff sued defendant, defen-
dant claimed Palmer was obligated in restitution. The court held
that equitable relief would not be granted where defendant "failed
to exercise reasonable prudence and diligence under the circum-
stances."8 The court did not elaborate, but apparently referred to
the fact that where defendant and Palmer had entered into a com-
plex business transaction, defendant should have paid more atten-
tion to the leased property. It was clear that defendant was aware
that Palmer had the property, for it received-and ig-
nored-frequent notices from plaintiff.
Frequently a claim for benefits conferred has been brought by
a subcontractor against the owner of property when a prime con-
tractor has defaulted. In those circumstances the owner has re-
quested the services and is on notice of their receipt. Even then
courts rarely grant relief, usually expressing the reasons in the
form that the enrichment is not unjust. For example, the subcon-
tractor could have secured payment through a mechanic's lien, the
value of services in restitution could exceed the contract price, and
the subcontractor accepted the risk of extending credit.83
One who, without intent to act gratuitously, confers a measurable benefit upon
another, is entitled to restitution, if he affords the other an opportunity to decline
the benefit or else has a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. If the other refuses
to receive the benefit, he is not required to make restitution unless the actor justi-
fiably performs for the other a duty imposed on him by law.
Id. at 1212.
79. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrTON § 2 (1937).
80. As, for example, in the case of services to protect life and safety. See RESTATEMENT
OF RESTrrTiON § 116 (1937); Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907).
81. 163 Mont. 263, 517 P.2d 383 (1973).
82. Id. at 267, 517 P.2d at 386.
83. See Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1444-50
(1974); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 288 (1975).
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In Kosmerl v. Barbour,84 the court upheld a denial of plaintiff
subcontractor's claim against defendant owner. The trial court
found that the general contractor was solely responsible for paying
this subcontractor even though defendant had paid other subcon-
tractors. It was significant that the owner had fully paid the con-
tract; this shifted the responsibility for payment to the general
contractor.8"
V. RESTITUTION WHEN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ARE UNWOUND
When a contract is unwound because of application of the
Statute of Frauds, impossibility of performance, mutual mistake,
indefiniteness, or other situations in which the obligations are
voidable or unenforceable, one party may have conferred a benefit
on the other.8 6 In this context, courts may apply principles of resti-
tution to determine the extent to which retention of the benefits is
"unjust. ' 8 7 Application of the doctrine may involve consideration
of such contract principles as identification of the breaching party,
allocation of risk, and fundamental fairness.88
A court may declare rescission of a contract and restitution of
benefits in the event of mistake.8 9 In Quinn v. Briggs,90 the court
reversed a judgment awarding restitution of payments made under
a contract for the purchase of a ranch. The trial court held that
plaintiff was mistaken as to the tax consequences of the transac-
tion, but the court reversed, holding that there was no mutual mis-
take where plaintiff had a duty to procure adequate advice and
was not misled by defendant.91 Rescission may be awarded only
where the mistake is mutual.92
A mutual mistake was found and careful consideration given
84. 180 Mont. 208, 589 P.2d 1017 (1979).
85. Id. at 213, 589 P.2d at 1020.
86. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 348; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
370 (1981). Perillo employs the useful phrase "the unwinding of contracts" to cover all situ-
ations where contractual duties have been found to be unenforceable, excused, or avoided,
attributing the phrase to J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 12 (1951). Perillo, supra note 66,
at 1209 n.13.
87. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 488; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
376 (1981).
88. Perillo, supra note 66, at 1223-26.
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1711(1) (1983).
90. 172 Mont. 468, 565 P.2d 297 (1977).
91. Id. at 478, 565 P.2d at 302.
92. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-408 to -410 (1983); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §
12 (1937). Restitution does not necessarily follow a finding of mutual mistake. See, e.g.,
Lenawee Co. Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 152, 154 (1981).
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to restitution in Berry v. Romain.9 3 Plaintiff and defendant agreed
on terms for the sale of an office building. Plaintiff sought rescis-
sion when he discovered that due to a title defect, defendant would
not be able to provide a promised parking lot. Finding a mutual
mistake as to a material part of the agreement, the court affirmed
the restitution of payments made less an offset for certain of de-
fendant's expenses.9 4 No offset was allowed for fair rental value
since the premises could not have been rented during the time
prior to rescission.95
In Baldwin v. Stuber, 9 plaintiff and defendant executed an
agreement for the sale of plaintiff's barber salon. Ignoring the
agreement, defendant entered into a lease with plaintiff's lessor for
plaintiff's premises and plaintiff removed his furniture and
fixtures. The trial court held that plaintiff was not entitled to re-
cover for breach of contract because there was no meeting of the
minds. 7 On appeal, the court accepted that conclusion, but held
that defendant must compensate plaintiff for the goodwill he re-
ceived by occupying the same premises."
The court in Baldwin was troubled by the fact that its judg-
ment allowed a recovery in restitution under a complaint alleging
an express contract.99 But the court found exceptions to this rule
in that a contract never came into existence, and the record
showed unusual and equitable reasons for the recovery.100 While
the result is correct, the principle is simpler. Plaintiff had con-
ferred a benefit upon defendant under circumstances which made
it unjust for defendant to retain the benefit. °1 The court recog-
nized this restitution interest by implication when it stated that
"[it appears . . . that plaintiff has in fact lost a valuable asset
without being compensated.' 2 The only impediment to recovery
was plaintiff's pleadings. Under modern rules of pleadings, the im-
pediment should have been removed. 03 Defendant could not have
93. - Mont. - , 632 P.2d 1127 (1981).
94. Although the court did not discuss the issue, these were apparently deducted as
reliance expenses. See 2 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 128 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as G. PALMER, RESTITUTION].
95. Berry, - Mont. at - , 632 P.2d at 1132.
96. 182 Mont. 501, 597 P.2d 1135 (1979).
97. Id. at 505-06, 597 P.2d at 1138.
98. Id. at 507, 597 P.2d at 1139.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 189-92.
100. Baldwin, 182 Mont. at 507, 597 P.2d at 1139.
101. None of the factors that might exclude restitutionary relief was present. See
supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
102. Baldwin, 182 Mont. at 507, 597 P.2d at 1139.
103. Perillo approaches the problem from another angle: "Are there reasons other
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been surprised by this claim, which was encompassed by the con-
tract claim and by the request for "other and further relief" in the
complaint.10 4
When a contract is discharged because of supervening impossi-
bility of performance, '0 5 the restitution interest can be difficult to
compute because the supervening act usually prevents full per-
formance.0 6 In Smith Engineering Co. v. Rice,0 7 plaintiff con-
tracted to build for defendant a refinery which was to produce
from crude oil sixty percent gasoline containing no more than one-
tenth of one percent sulphur. The refinery did not perform as
promised. When plaintiff sought payment due, defendant claimed
breach of contract. The federal district court held that plaintiff
was in breach for failing to meet the agreed upon standards even
though the standards were impossible for anyone to meet.108
The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that by statute the im-
possibility voided the contract. 0 9 The Montana Supreme Court
had previously held that where a contract is void for illegality
under the same statute, the beneficiary of the services rendered is
required to make restitution to the other party." 0 In Smith Engi-
neering, although the contract price was $482,545, the court al-
lowed a recovery in quantum meruit of $535,146." This appears to
be the only case applying Montana law where the recovery in resti-
tution exceeded the contract price. 1 2 While such a recovery is al-
than those attributable to extinct pleading taboos, why restitution in a contractual context
has been classified as quasi-contractual, rather than as a contractual remedy." Perillo, supra
note 66, at 1217 (footnote omitted). "Extinct pleading taboos" retain surprising potency in
Montana. See infra text accompanying notes 173-97.
104. MONT. R. Civ. P. 8(f), 15(b), 54(c). See also Adams v. Chilcott, 182 Mont. 511,
517, 597 P.2d 1140, 1144 (1979) (citing Foy v. Anderson, 176 Mont. 507, 511, 580 P.2d 114,
116 (1978)): "In addition to the specific relief prayed for in his complaint, respondent
sought 'such other relief as to the Court may seem proper.' We note that courts have 'the
power to grant complete relief under (their] equity power.'"
105. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 468; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
377 (1981).
106. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 7.1.
107. 102 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 637 (1939).
108. Id. at 496-97. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 12 (1962).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-603 (1983) provides:
Where a contract has but a single object and such object is unlawful, whether in
whole or in part, or wholly impossible of performance or so vaguely expressed as
to be wholly unascertainable, the entire contract is void.
110. Smith Engineering, 102 F.2d at 499 (citing Hill Co. v. Shaw & Borden Co., 225 F.
475 (9th Cir. 1915); Hicks v. Stillwater Co., 84 Mont. 38, 274 P. 296 (1929); Morse v. Bd. of
Comm., 19 Mont. 450, 48 P. 745 (1897); State v. Dickerman, 16 Mont. 279, 40 P. 698 (1895)).
111. Id.
112. It is difficult to ascertain from the opinion the relationship between the contract
price and plaintiff's damage claim. The trial decision was not reported and the issue of
impossibility was first raised by the circuit court. Furthermore, plaintiff performed work
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lowed in the majority of jurisdictions, it is usually not granted
where plaintiff has completed performance." 3 Moreover, the result
compelled a defendant to pay more than the contract price for less
than the contract performance. While the finding of impossibility
avoids an attribution of fault, it would seem equitable to measure
the recovery by the value of the benefit conferred, which must logi-
cally be less than the contract price." 4
When an agreement is found to be unenforceable, restitution
is generally available for benefit conferred." 5 In Kidder v. Har-
ding," '6 where plaintiff ranch hand worked for five months under
an unenforceable agreement, he recovered the value of his services,
expenses paid to defendant, certain reliance expenses, and the
value of his property used by defendant. Deductions were made for
the use of defendant's equipment and for goods received from
defendant.
In Fink v. Doggett, 1 7 during negotiations for the purchase of a
ranch, plaintiff turned $2500 over to a real estate broker who
turned it over to defendant. Plaintiff claimed that the $2500 was
paid as a deposit with the understanding that no agreement would
exist without a writing. Defendant claimed the money was a down
payment forfeited by plaintiff's refusal to perform. In addition, de-
fendant alleged he suffered a loss when plaintiff went into posses-
sion of the property and damaged the crops. The jury found that
defendant was entitled to retain the $2500.'1 The court held that
the trial court had erroneously refused one of plaintiff's proposed
jury instructions." Under the proposed instruction, if the jury
found an agreement had been formed but was unenforceable be-
cause oral, plaintiff was entitled to recovery of the deposit less the
crop loss. 20
While the Statute of Frauds12 ' provides that oral agreements
beyond that called for in the contract in an effort to achieve the contract specifications; this
work may have been the basis for the additional recovery. Id. at 492.
113. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 7.5.
114. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 (1981). Comment b states that "to
the extent that the contract price can be roughly apportioned to the work done, recovery
will not be allowed in excess of the appropriate amount of the price."
115. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 6.1.
116. 177 Mont. 499, 582 P.2d 747 (1978).
117. 123 Mont. 324, 214 P.2d 743 (1949).
118. Id. at 326, 214 P.2d at 745.
119. Id. at 328, 214 P.2d at 745 (citing Helmes v. K. & M. Realty Co., 41 Ohio App.
322, 180 N.E. 210 (1931)).
120. Fink, 123 Mont. at 328, 214 P.2d at 745. The court cited what are now MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-311 and 27-1-317 (1983) as a basis for recovery of the losses.
121. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903(d) (1983).
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for the sale of real property are "invalid," it is not clear what effect
this provision has on recovery in restitution on an agreement
within the statute.122 In a minority of states, where an agreement
within the statute is "void," a party who refuses to perform, like
plaintiff in Fink, may recover in restitution. 2 3 In the majority of
jurisdictions, where an agreement within the statute is "unenforce-
able," a party who would not recover if the agreement were en-
forceable may not recover where it is not.'12  This fault principle
prevents the Statute of Frauds from being used as a sword instead
of a shield.
While Fink suggests that Montana follows the minority rule,
Lewis v. Peterson2 5 urges the majority rule on the theory that the
law should compel parties to live up to their agreements-even
their unenforceable ones. In Lewis, purchaser paid seller a $1000
down payment on an oral agreement to purchase real property and
seller paid a broker $225. Purchaser then failed to carry out the
transaction and sought restitution of the $1000. The court held
that purchaser was "guilty of a breach of his contract" but granted
relief from forfeiture because of his mental incapacity.'2 6 Seller was
allowed a credit for the $225; while the court did not explain the
award, it must have been reliance damages.12 7 The court got off the
track in Lewis by finding that purchaser had breached a contract.
To reach the same result, it should have treated the unenforceable
contract as if it were an enforceable contract.
Concurring, Justice Angstrom criticized the majority for bas-
ing the result on what would have occurred with respect to an en-
forceable agreement. He claimed that seller was relying upon a de-
fense-the oral sale of real property-which seller could not prove.
122. ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 355; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375
(1981).
123. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 6.2. The minority rule is also known as the "Wiscon-
sin" rule after the leading case of Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142 (1860).
124. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375 (1981).
125. 127 Mont. 474, 267 P.2d 127 (1954).
126. Id. at 477-78, 267 P.2d at 128-29. Apparently, purchaser did not plead lack of
capacity. If a plaintiff lacks mental capacity, an agreement is voidable under MONT. CODE
ANN. § 28-2-203 (1983). That section provides that the conveyance or contract is subject to
rescission under MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-1701 to -1716 (1983). But § 28-2-1711 does not
provide for rescission for mental incapacity alone. There must be a showing of duress, men-
ace, fraud, or undue influence as well. See Fleming v. Consolidated Motor Sales Co., 74
Mont. 245, 240 P. 376 (1925). This oversight was corrected in the corresponding California
statute, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1689(7) (West 1973).
127. While the Wisconsin rule allows a seller to recover reliance expenses, a seller who
refuses to perform should not recover them. The rule attempts to overlook fault, but it
would be unfair to allow a defaulting seller to shift the expense of preparation for perform-
ance to buyer. See 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 6.2, at 13-14.
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Putting that defense aside, he would have allowed recovery be-
cause there was no consideration for the $1000 paid.1" The illogic
of this approach is that not all payments made without considera-
tion are recoverable, e.g., gifts.
The dilemma here is that one way or another courts must con-
sider the "unprovable" agreement. If the court simply recognizes
that defendant has been enriched by plaintiff, how can plaintiff
prove that the benefit was not conferred officiously or as a gift?
And how can defendant explain the expenses in reliance on the
agreement, since this expenditure did not enrich plaintiff?. Only
through evidence of the oral agreement. "
Proof of the agreement shows that plaintiff paid the money in
the expectation of receiving some consideration. But if the only
reason plaintiff did not receive the consideration was plaintiff's
own refusal to perform, can the enrichment be said to be unjust?
Most courts have resolved the problem by denying restitution to a
defaulting purchaser under the unenforceable agreement just as
under an enforceable agreement. 130
This result was reached by implication in the recent case of
Robertus v. Candee.'3' Plaintiffs orally leased 1250 acres from de-
fendant for three or four years under a crop share arrangement
whereby plaintiffs would break the land and farm it at their own
expense and pay defendant a one-quarter share of the crop. A few
months later, a dispute arose. After plaintiffs had broken 1000
acres, disked 680, and planted 320, defendant terminated the
agreement and harvested and sold the wheat, netting $26,180. The
trial court held the lease unenforceable and awarded plaintiff
$55,000 in restitution for the increase in the value of the land,
three-quarters of the wheat crop, and the value of work, seed, and
fertilizer."3 2
On appeal, defendant claimed that restitution was not applica-
ble. The court held that it was, stating that "where one party repu-
diates a contract or breaches it by non-performance, the injured
party may seek restitution of the unjust enrichment whether the
Statute of Frauds applies or not."' 33 As it did in Lewis, the court
seemed to state the paradox of breach of an invalid agreement.
128. Lewis, 127 Mont. at 481, 267 P.2d at 126.
129. Perillo uses the problem of the Statute of Frauds to illustrate his thesis that the
action for restitution is an action based on contract. Perillo, supra note 66, at 1215-16.
130. Restitution is not always denied a defaulting purchaser. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 229-44.
131. - Mont. -, 670 P.2d 540 (1983).
132. Id. at -, 670 P.2d at 541-42.
133. Id. at -, 670 P.2d at 542.
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This would make sense under the rule of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 375, which treats defaults under contracts within
the Statute of Frauds the same as those outside the statute, but
that was not the court's position. The court declined to address the
issue of the effect of the Statute of Frauds, finding that the breach
gave plaintiff a right of rescission and restitution. 34 While the re-
sult in this case would be the same under either theory, Robertus
should have been treated as a case where contractual obligations
were unwound when unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds
rather than as a case of breach of contract.
VI. RESTITUTION DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
A. Rescission
When a party has breached an enforceable agreement, the
remedies available to the other party as plaintiff depend on
whether or not the breach is material. If the breach is not material,
plaintiff may elect remedies serving the reliance and expectation
interests. Restitution is not available for non-material breach be-
cause plaintiff is not excused from performance and must confer
the bargained-for benefit on defendant, less damages. If the breach
is material, as an alternative to the other remedies plaintiff may
seek restitution, i.e., compensation for the benefit conferred upon
defendant. 18 For example, A purchases from B for $10,000 a mo-
bile home which turns out to be defective. If the defects are not
material, A must still pay the purchase price but may deduct the
cost of repair. If the defects are material, as an alternative to re-
covering the cost of repair, A may elect to recover the purchase
price. 186
The remedy of restitution in the event of material breach is
known as rescission.13 7 For a court to decree a rescission in the
134. Id. The court then treated restitution as a source of primary rights for purposes
of computing damages. See infra note 203.
135. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, §§ 347, 350, 351, 353; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 373 (1981); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1104.
136. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer of non-conforming goods who ac-
cepts the goods may recover damages. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-601, -607, -714, -717
(1983). If the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods, the buyer may
revoke acceptance and may rescind the agreement in addition to recovering expectancy
damages. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-601, -608, -711 (1983).
137. Under MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-1701 to -1716 (1983), the judicial remedy of
rescission is available in a number of other circumstances, including mutual consent of the
parties and avoidance of the contract by one of the parties. Corbin would limit the concept
of rescission to the mutual discharge of obligations by the parties. 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
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event of breach, it must determine that defendant's breach is sig-
nificant enough to justify protection of plaintiff's restitution inter-
est. Rescission in these circumstances can only be granted where
the breach is material,"'8 plaintiff is excused from performance," 9
and plaintiff desires compensation for the benefit conferred rather
than damages. 40 In granting the remedy, the court may require
plaintiff to return any benefit received... or may make any other
equitable adjustment. 42
When a plaintiff requests rescission, the issue is often whether
the breach is material, although the court may not frame it that
way. In Leiman-Scott, Inc. v. Holmes, 4" plaintiff sold defendants
exclusive distribution rights to a product for $10,000 payable at
$2000 per year. Defendants paid for two years and then defaulted.
When plaintiff sued for the balance due, defendants raised breach
of a noncompetition clause as a defense. The trial court, finding
that breach of the noncompetition clause cost defendants $1500 in
sales, dismissed the complaint."'
On appeal, the court stated that "[the buyer] may rescind the
contract and sue for a recovery of the money paid; but he cannot
insist that the contract has been rescinded and yet recover on the
contract."'' 5 That unwieldy statement simply means that restitu-
tion is available where there is a material breach of contract but
not where there is an immaterial breach. In Leiman-Scott, because
1105, at 567. See, e.g., Cruse v. Clawson, 137 Mont. 439, 352 P.2d 989 (1960) (question of
fact whether rescission was mutual or a unilateral termination); Spence v. Yocum, -
Mont. -, 651 P.2d 1022 (1982) (rescission for fraud).
138. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1711(2) (1983). For factors used in determining whether
a breach is material, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1981).
139. For factors used in determining whether duties are discharged, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1981).
140. Return of the benefit conferred may be in the form of either money damages or in
specie (specific restitution). See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1107. The circumstances in which
specific relief is available are, like specific performance itself, beyond the scope of this
article.
141. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-1713(2), -1716 (1983). See O'Keefe v. Rutledge, 110
Mont. 138, 103 P.2d 307 (1940) (return of benefit not required where the performance was
divisible and plaintiff fully paid for that which was retained). The case is annotated at 148
A.L.R. 409 (1940).
142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1716 (1983) provides:
On adjudging the rescission of a contract, the court may require the party to
whom such relief is granted to make any compensation or restoration to the other
which justice may require.
143. 142 Mont. 58, 381 P.2d 489 (1963).
144. Id. at 60, 381 P.2d at 490.
145. Id. at 61, 381 P.2d at 490 (quoting Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Terpening,
58 Mont. 507, 511, 193 P. 752, 754 (1920)). Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the state-
ment is untrue. A buyer may in some circumstances rescind and recover expectancy dam-
ages. See supra note 136.
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plaintiff's breach was not material, defendants were not excused
from performance and could not seek restitution."'
The issues involved in a claim for rescission were properly an-
alyzed by the court in Compton v. Alcorn.141 Plaintiffs sought re-
scission of an agreement to purchase a mobile home. The court af-
firmed findings that plaintiffs had fully performed, that the defects
were "so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the
parties in making the agreement," and that a rescission was war-
ranted.148 In dissent, Justice Daly argued that both parties were in
breach and that defendant's breach was not material."1
9
When a rescission is adjudged, the court may require the re-
scinding party to restore the consideration acquired from the other
party.1 50 Under this equitable adjustment, the rescinding party
may be required to pay for use of the property during the time of
possession, for example, the rental value of land' 5' or depreciation
of an automobile.'52 But property can also appreciate, making res-
toration to the parties' previous positions more difficult. In Scott v.
Hjelm, 53 the court granted rescission of an oral agreement in
which plaintiff gave defendant a $1000 down payment on the
purchase of a mare and took possession of the mare. While in
plaintiff's possession, the mare foaled and was gravid at the time of
trial. The court affirmed the judgment awarding plaintiff return of
the down payment plus $250 for the care of the mare and awarding
defendant return of the mare with the unborn foal.' 5 4 Defendant
claimed she was not returned to the status quo if plaintiff kept the
foal, but the court stated that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion since defendant got back what she originally had-a mare
and an unborn foal. 55 Dissenting, Justice Sheehy argued that de-
fendant was not restored to the status quo, for the mare had lost
breeding time while in plaintiff's possession. 56
146. Leiman-Scott, 142 Mont. at 62, 381 P.2d at 491.
147. 171 Mont. 230, 557 P.2d 292 (1976). See also Hardin v. Hill, 149 Mont. 68, 423
P.2d 309 (1967).
148. Compton, 171 Mont. at 235, 557 P.2d at 295-96.
149. Id. at 237, 557 P.2d at 296-97.
150. See supra note 142.
151. See, e.g., Brooks v. Jensen, 75 Idaho 201, 270 P.2d 425 (1954).
152. In T&W Chevrolet v. Darvial, - Mont. __, 641 P.2d 1368 (1982), defendant
was granted rescission but was not compelled to pay for use of the automobile. Cf. the Mon-
tana "Lemon Law," MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-501 to -507 (1983), which provides for "a
reasonable allowance for the consumer's use" upon rescission in § 61-4-503(2).
153. - Mont. - , 613 P.2d 1385 (1980).
154. Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 1387-88.
155. Id. at -' 613 P.2d at 1388.
156. Id. (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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Often the court has erroneously addressed the issue of "elec-
tion of remedies" when a party seeks rescission. In Harrington v.
Holiday Rambler Corp.,5 7 the court stated that "a party may not
pursue both an action for recission [sic] and damages for deceit or
misrepresentation." The court may have meant that a party may
not recover both, but it makes sense to plead both. A plaintiff who
can prove the breach is material will then be eligible for restitu-
tion, but a plaintiff who cannot prove the breach is material may
still be eligible for damages. 8
When restitution is available, incidental reliance damages may
also be recoverable. In Harrington,"9 the court cited Fraser v.
Clark' 6 as authority for the proposition that a party is not entitled
to pursue both remedies. But the holding in Fraser is just the op-
posite. In Fraser, plaintiffs, sellers of a ranch, sued for breach of a
purchase agreement. Defendants sought rescission on the grounds
of fraud, restitution for improvements to the property and pay-
ments made, and expenses incurred because of plaintiffs' use of a
pasture. The trial court, finding a material breach entitling defen-
dants to rescind, awarded damages for the improvements and the
expenses, less reasonable rental value for defendants' occupancy.''
On appeal, plaintiffs admitted that if rescission were proper, resti-
tution for the improvements was proper, but argued that rescission
and damages were incompatible remedies." 2
The court held that these remedies were not incompatible:
"the damages for feeding cattle prior to discovery of the fraud are
other than the mere loss of the bargain and are damages which
were naturally and proximately the result of plaintiffs' fraud.""'
In other words, recovery of those expenses did not give defendants
the expectancy but restored them to the status quo. Nor did the
award give them a double recovery. The expenses were incurred as
an incidental expense of their attempt to perform. 6
157. 176 Mont. 37, 46, 575 P.2d 578, 583 (1978) (citing Fraser v. Clark, 137 Mont. 362,
376, 352 P.2d 681, 688 (1960)).
158. See, e.g., Preston v. McDonnell,__ Mont. - , 659 P.2d 276 (1983) (no breach,
rescission denied); Moore v. Swanson, 171 Mont. 160, 556 P.2d 1249 (1976) (non-material
breach, damages awarded); Russell v. Russell, 152 Mont. 461, 452 P.2d 77 (1969) (material
breach, rescission granted).
159. Harrington, 176 Mont. at 46, 575 P.2d at 583.
160. 137 Mont. 362, 352 P.2d 681 (1960).
161. Id. at 373-74, 352 P.2d at 687.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 378, 352 P.2d at 689.
164. For example, if a party is injured by defective goods, return of the goods for a
refund (i.e., rescission) does not bar a claim for damages for breach of the warranty. See 5A
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1223.
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While the court suggested that plaintiffs should have moved to
compel defendants to make an election of remedies prior to ap-
peal, 6 5 the damage award would have been proper even in the face
of the motion. The issue arises because of the conceptual distinc-
tion between restitution and reliance. Remedies serving the resti-
tution interest compel defendant to restore benefits conferred on
defendant while those serving the reliance interest compel defen-
dant to pay for plaintiff's expenses, some of which may have bene-
fited defendant and some third parties.' s Some commentators pre-
fer to think of reliance in terms of restoring plaintiff to the status
quo, which encompasses both interests.167 Most importantly, the
concern should not be with pigeonholing the remedies but with
compensating plaintiff for loss.
Circumstances may arise, however, in which the benefit con-
ferred may exceed the bargained-for consideration. In that event,
damages measured by the restitution interest may exceed the ex-
pectation measure. For example, A, a computer consultant who
regularly bills at $50 per hour, agrees to write a program for B for
a flat fee of $1000. If A fully performs the contract, A's recovery is
$1000 irrespective of the extent of A's endeavors.'6 8 But suppose B
terminates the contract without cause after A has spent 25 hours
and completed 75% of the work? 6 9 There are three possible mea-
sures of A's recovery on B's breach:
(a) $1250, the reasonable value of A's services (25 hours at $50/
hour);
(b) $1000, the measure in (a), but with the contract price as a
ceiling; or
(c) $750, the pro-rata portion of the contract price completed.
Under measure (a), A can recover more for part performance
than for full performance; the theory here is that the contract, hay-
165. Fraser, 137 Mont. at 375-76, 352 P.2d at 687-88.
166. See supra Part I.
167. See Burrows, supra note 1, at 219-21. See also supra note 4.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(2) (1981).
169. The example involves personal services rather than construction. The situation is
unlikely to arise in a construction case because (a) the contractor will probably breach
rather than perform when the cost of performance exceeds the contract price, and (b) the
owner will probably accept the more valuable performance rather than breach. Nevertheless,
the situation has arisen. See Palmer, The Contract Price As A Limit on Restitution for
Defendant's Breach, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 270 n.26 (1959).
The example might not be applicable to services performed by an attorney. Several
courts have held that an attorney's right to recover in restitution is limited lest the claim for
fees restrict the client's right to discharge counsel without cause. See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent,
6 Cal. 3d 784, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9 (1972); Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 604 (1957) (non-
contingent fee contracts); Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 690 (1979) (contingent fee contracts).
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ing been materially breached, is irrelevant. Since A has elected to
sue not on the expectation interest but on the restitution interest,
the only issue is the value of A's services. 70 This measure is the
rule in the majority of jurisdictions.' 7 ' In Montana, plaintiffs have
often sought recovery under the restitution rather than the expec-
tation interest, but there is no clear instance where the recovery in
restitution exceeded the contract price. 72 It is therefore unsettled
which rule Montana will follow.
B. Pleading Restitution or Express Contract
While plaintiff's choice between the restitution and expecta-
tion interests is a question of substantive law, the Montana court
has too often treated it as a question of procedure, trying to find a
pigeonhole into which to fit the case.'73 Like most pleading
problems, this one has its roots in common law. In an action in
special assumpsit, plaintiff pleaded the contract. But in general as-
sumpsit, plaintiff pleaded one of the common counts, such as
quantum meruit. In such a case there might actually have been a
contract, and reference was frequently made to it in the proof, but
it could not be mentioned in pleading. 17 4 In Montana, where plain-
tiff may have a claim either on an express contract or in restitu-
tion, the court has derived various rules from common law
pleading: 75
1. When a complaint alleges restitution, an express contract may
not be proved. This rule is subject to two exceptions:
170. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-813 (1983) provides:
When a contract does not determine the amount of the consideration or the
method by which it is to be ascertained or when it leaves the amount thereof to
the discretion of an interested party, the consideration must be so much money as
the object of the contract is reasonably worth.
On the measure of restitution, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981).
An excellent demonstration of the evidence that may be presented to prove the reasonable
value of services is found in Holland Constr. Co. v. Lampson, 165 Mont. 356, 528 P.2d 1327
(1974). See also Smith v. Gunniss, 115 Mont. 362, 144 P.2d 186 (1944).
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (1981).
172. See Smith Engineering Co. v. Rice, 102 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1938), discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 105-14.
173. Corbin decries this harking back to ancient practices:
[O]ur interest today lies not in the court or the procedure wherein the remedy
was formerly obtainable, but in the varying fact situations in which the remedy
would be granted by any of the courts and in the extent to which and the form in
which restitution would be compelled.
5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1102, at 551.
174. Perillo, supra note 66, at 1215-16. The situation fits Perillo's thesis that restitu-
tion is a contractual remedy.
175. Puetz v. Carlson, 139 Mont. 373, 378-80, 364 P.2d 742, 745-46 (1961).
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(a) when a contract is fully performed, a complaint may al-
lege restitution and the express contract is proof of the value of
the services rendered;
(b) when defendant prevents full performance of an express
contract, the express contract may be proved even though the
complaint alleges restitution.
2. When a complaint alleges an express contract, restitution may
not be proved.
Rule 1 was applied in Keneally v. Orgain.17 6 Plaintiff, a dis-
charged commission salesman, claimed defendant, his former em-
ployer, owed him commissions earned prior to his discharge on the
basis of restitution. But under plaintiff's express contract, commis-
sions were credited only if the goods were installed and invoiced
during the term of employment. The court held that it was fatal
for plaintiff to have brought a claim in restitution when he had an
express contract. 177 The decision can be explained as a matter of
substantive law rather than procedure, for restitution is not availa-
ble as a remedy where the contract has not been discharged. 178
Rule 1(a) is illustrated by Falls Sand and Gravel Co. v. West-
ern Concrete, Inc.,' 79 and Matos v. Rohrer.80 In Falls, plaintiff
supplier of sand alleged that defendant's promise of a price adjust-
ment for increased costs in drying the sand modified their original
agreement. The court implicitly barred proof of the alleged modifi-
cation"'8 and treated the claim as one for restitution. In Matos,
plaintiff builder sought to recover in restitution $17,000 over the
ceiling price of a house he constructed for defendants. The court
found that a contract to build a house on a "cost-plus" basis with a
ceiling of $86,000 created an express contract to build the house
for $86,000.182 In both cases, once the finder of fact found an ex-
press contract, the court followed the substantive rule that on full
performance, the contract price is the limit of plaintiff's
recovery.'83
176. - Mont. - , 606 P.2d 127 (1980).
177. Id. at -, 606 P.2d at 129.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36.
179. 270 F. Supp. 495 (D. Mont. 1967).
180. - Mont. -, 661 P.2d 443 (1983).
181. While the court cited the agreement as "parol," it would be barred not as parol
evidence but as a subsequent oral modification of a written agreement under what is now
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-1406 (1983). Falls, 270 F. Supp. at 505.
182. Matos, __ Mont. at -, 661 P.2d at 448.
183. See supra text accompanying note 168. See also Gyrion v. Sanders, 168 Mont.
214, 541 P.2d 348 (1975) (agreement that repairs would not exceed insurance recovery of
$20,000); St. James Hosp. v. Dept. of Social and Rehabilitational Services, 182 Mont. 80, 595
P.2d 379 (1979) (agreement that reimbursement for Medicaid services would not exceed
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In Puetz v. Carlson8 4 plaintiff contractor sued defendant
owner in restitution and proved an express contract at trial. Defen-
dant claimed the variance surprised the defense, for prevention of
performance under an express contract is not an issue in restitu-
tion. The court held that the complaint sufficiently advised defen-
dant "that there may have been an express contract."' 85 Because
there was a finding that defendant had breached, Rule 1(b) ap-
plied. Although the court did not make clear how damages were
computed, since plaintiff alleged performance of services worth
$4408 and defendant alleged an express contract price of $6309,
the court did not have to reach the issue of whether the contract
price is a ceiling on recovery in restitution.
In DeFord v. Wansink, 8 6 plaintiff alleged damages for both
breach of contract and restitution arising from an agreement to
raise cattle for defendant. The trial court found a material breach
and determined plaintiff's recovery in restitution "without regard
to the part of the written contract performed."'1 7 This language
did not mean that the recovery was allowed irrespective of whether
the entire agreement was performed. Rather, it meant that the
contract was not divisible and performance of the first half, when
the calves were younger, was more valuable than performance of
the second half.188 This is a thoughtful and non-mechanical appli-
cation of the principle of restitution.
The danger of a court's attempting to shape the facts to fit a
rule rather than carefully analyzing them is illustrated by Survco
v. Kenyon Noble Ready-Mix," 9 in which the trial court applied
Rule 2 where it was not applicable. Plaintiff performed a series of
photographic services for defendant, sending defendant two bills
which were paid and a third which was not. The trial court, stating
that "it is fatal to plaintiff's cause to allege and prove an express
contract and to attempt to recover judgment based upon a theory
of quantum meruit because the terms of the contract limit such
recovery to the agreed price for the services rendered," apparently
limited plaintiff's recovery to the express contract, represented by
the first two bills.' 90 On appeal, the court suggested that plaintiff
was suing in quantum meruit and using the express contract as
federal guidelines).
184. 139 Mont. 373, 364 P.2d 742 (1961).
185. Id. at 381, 364 P.2d at 746.
186. 152 Mont. 487, 452 P.2d 73 (1969).
187. Id. at 493, 452 P.2d at 76.
188. Id.
189. - Mont. - , 664 P.2d 943 (1983).
190. Id. at __, 664 P.2d at 945.
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proof of the reasonable value of the services. 1'91
Both explanations appear strained. A sounder explanation is
that no express contract was created because the parties had not
agreed on a material element, namely price. Plaintiff's claim was
therefore properly in restitution for the value of goods and services
provided at defendant's request. The court recognized this in its
conclusion, which is a laudable statement of the restitution inter-
est: "[Defendant] has accepted the benefits of the contract by ob-
taining prints of all the aerial photograph projects. We find [he]
must be required to pay for that which he has received and that
the District Court's limitation of Survco's recovery was in error."' 92
Examination of the rules applied in this line of cases indicates
that they can be reduced to three well-known propositions, two
substantive and one procedural:
(1) a party may not recover more than the contract price for full
performance;' 9
(2) where there has been material breach, the non-breaching
party may recover in restitution;194
(3) a party may not prove a claim at trial that takes the other
party by surprise.'"
A court may place the plaintiff on the horns of a dilemma if its
procedural requirements are not flexible. On the one hand, a court
may find claims for breach of contract and restitution incompatible
and compel an election. On the other hand, if the contract is found
unenforceable at trial, plaintiff's only claim for relief is in restitu-
tion. 96 A pleader would be well-advised to plead both claims; while
a court may not grant relief on both claims, it should not compel
an election until necessary to prevent confusion. 97
VII. RESTITUTION FOR A BREACHING PARTY
A. The Competing Interests
When calculating the expectation interest, the court is ex-
tremely careful to insure that parties recover no more than their
losses.198 This principle is codified in Montana Code Annotated
191. Id. at -, 664 P.2d at 946.
192. Id.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104 & 189-92.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 (1981).
198. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 11-13.
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section 27-1-303:
No person can recover a greater amount in damages for the
breach of an obligation than he could have gained by the full per-
formance thereof on both sides unless a greater recovery is speci-
fied by statute.19'
Yet the court is not as careful to limit recovery when a non-breach-
ing party has received part performance from the breaching party.
A non-breaching party who keeps the benefits of performance and
also recovers the expectancy will in fact profit from the breach.
The issue-an ancient one in contract law200-is whether a
breaching party is entitled to restitution for benefits conferred on
the non-breaching party before a material breach.20 In addressing
this issue, it is assumed that before restitution for the breaching
party is considered, the non-breaching party's interests will be pro-
tected. For example, A agrees to build a house for B for $50,000 of
which $5000 represents A's profit. After A has completed half the
work at an out-of-pocket cost of $28,000, A abandons the contract.
There are two considerations prior to determining A's recovery.
First, A's recovery is subordinate to B's expectancy damages. Thus,
if the cost of completion is $30,000, A's recovery can be no more
than $20,000 in order to give B the expectancy: a house at a cost of
$50,000. Second, A's recovery is limited to the pro-rata portion of
the total contract price that A's performance represents. Thus, if
the cost of completion is $20,000, A's recovery can be no more than
$25,000 (half of the $50,000 contract price).20 2 As between the two
parties, the benefit of the favorable cost of completion should go to
the non-breaching party rather than the breaching party.
Furthermore, in order to minimize the benefit, the measure of
damages in restitution for a breaching party may differ from the
measure for a non-breaching party. For example, A agrees to build
a wall for B for $5000. A spends $5000 to build ninety percent of
the wall and B breaches. When A is the non-breaching party, A's
199. Curiously, the only citation of MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-303 (1983) is in Roundup
Cattle Feeders v. Horpestad, 184 Mont. 480, 603 P.2d 1044 (1979), which did not follow it.
The non-breaching party in Horpestad received not only the benefit of the bargain but the
benefit of the breaching party's part performance. See infra text accompanying notes 212-
219.
200. See 12 S. WILLISTON, A TREATIsE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1473 (1970); 5 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1123.
201. See ANNOTATIONS, supra note 29, § 357; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
374 (1981).
202. If there were no completion, A's recovery should not include profits, for A is re-
covering on the basis of restitution and not expectancy. See Nordstrom & Woodland, Recov-
ery By Building Contractor in Default, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 193, 214 (1959).
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recovery is measured by the value of the services performed. 03 On
the other hand, if A spends $5000 but builds the wall so defectively
that there is no substantial performance, A's recovery in restitu-
tion may be measured by the value of the benefit to B, which may
be considerably less than A's expense. 04 If these considerations are
taken into account before awarding restitution, expectancy dam-
ages fully compensate the non-breaching party and the breaching
party does not benefit from the breach." 5
Montana has on occasion denied restitution to the breaching
party. In Riddell v. Peck-Williamson Heating and Ventilating
Co. ,206 plaintiff contracted to perform construction work for defen-
dant for approximately $11,500. Under the facts as found, plaintiff
stopped work without cause and claimed $9300 in restitution. The
court found that the claim was for partial performance of an indi-
visible contract.0 7 Courts have divided over whether to award res-
titution to the breaching party in such a situation. In the leading
case of Britton v. Turner,s0 5 the New Hampshire Supreme Court
allowed recovery to an employee who had performed nine and a
half months of a twelve-month contract before breaching, reason-
ing that it would be unfair to allow one to keep without payment a
benefit that could not be returned.2 09 The court in Riddell disap-
proved Britton, stating that morality may compel payment for a
benefit received but the law did not.2 10 The court was concerned
that under such a rule parties would violate their agreements and
courts would enforce agreements that were never made. Defendant
203. See supra note 170. In Robertus v. Candee, - Mont. - , 670 P.2d 540
(1983), the court regarded breach of an agreement unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds as a breach of contract. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34. For purposes of
damages, the court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP CONTRACTS § 371 (1981) for the proposi-
tion that the measure was either the cost of labor and materials or the value of enhance-
ment, but not both, as the trial court had incorrectly ruled. The court went on to limit the
award to that part of the enrichment that was unjust. Here the court confused restitution in
the absence of contract with restitution for the breach of contract. Consistent with its hold-
ing that restitution was a proper remedy for this breach of contract, the court meant simply
that plaintiffs should recover only the value of the benefit they conferred.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 (1981); Builders Supply Co. v. City
of Helena, 116 Mont. 368, 154 P.2d 270 (1944).
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 (1981), 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
1124. Restitution was granted to a contractor in breach in Nelson v. Hazel, 91 Idaho 850,
433 P.2d 120 (1967).
206. 27 Mont. 44, 69 P. 241 (1902).
207. Id. at 58, 69 P. at 243.
208. 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
209. This situation would not arise today in an employment context, as modern wage
statutes require more frequent pay periods, but it could arise with an independent contrac-
tor. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-204 (1983).
210. Riddell, 27 Mont. at 60, 69 P. at 244.
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was allowed to retain the $9300 worth of work without payment.2 1 1
The same result was reached in a more modern case. In
Roundup Cattle Feeders v. Horpestad,2  when cattle prices fell,
plaintiff defaulted on a cattle-feeding joint venture and sought res-
titution for the feed it had furnished defendant. On his counter-
claim, defendant was awarded expectancy damages-the cost of
moving and feeding the cattle. The court held that plaintiff was
not entitled to restitution because the contract was not severable
and plaintiff's breach was willful. 13 The concepts of severability
and willfulness are often employed to make fine distinctions that
ultimately determine whether or not recovery will be allowed.
These factors were termed "emotional" by Judge Clark of the Sec-
ond Circuit in a concurring opinion in Harris v. The Cecil N.
Bean,1 4 a case cited in Horpestad: "I endorse Professor Corbin's
view that we ought to reject these emotional grounds of decision
and do what he demonstrates the courts tend to do in reality,
namely, look to whether real benefit has been conferred or not.
2 15
In Horpestad, the court stated that plaintiff was not entitled
to equitable relief on the grounds that a wrongdoer may not take
advantage of his own wrong, citing Mitchell v. Pestal"16 as author-
ity. In Mitchell, plaintiff sought to quiet title to land which it con-
veyed before it acquired title. The court held that title inured to
the grantee.1 7 In equity, the court would not allow the grantor to
retain a consideration where the grantee received nothing. In
Mitchell, the party which committed the wrong also retained a
benefit, while in Horpestad the party which committed the wrong
(assuming, as the court does, that breach of contract is a wrong)
211. Id.
212. 184 Mont. 480, 603 P.2d 1044 (1979).
213. Id. at 486, 603 P.2d at 1048.
214. 197 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1952).
215. 197 F.2d at 922 (Clark, J., concurring). Corbin is worth quoting at length:
Such terms as "wilful," "deliberate," "intentional," "fraudulent," are epithets
characterizing the quality of the conduct of one guilty of a breach of contract and
expressing the mental attitude of the court. There is a high degree of discretion
and flexibility in the remedies that are available for the purposes of justice; within
this degree, both verdict and judgment are inevitably affected by the court's opin-
ion of conduct. Nevertheless, this very discretion and flexibility should operate so
that punishments are not "cruel and unusual," so that "the penalty may fit the
crime." Not even a "wilful" wrongdoer is an outlaw; and the enrichment of even
an injured man may become unjust. In refusing compensation or restitution to a
wrongdoer, his conduct may properly be described epithetically; but the fact that
it may be so described does not automatically decide the case and make it unnec-
essary to weigh and give effect to other factors therein.
5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1123, at 11.
216. 123 Mont. 142, 208 P.2d 807 (1949).
217. Id. at 150-51, 208 P.2d at 811.
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suffered a detriment. The case is analogous only if compensating a
party for services provided is equated with obtaining an advantage
for that party.
The court also supported its decision in Horpestad by citing
Montana cases disapproving of willful breach. If recovery were al-
lowed in these circumstances, the court stated, the law would "en-
courage parties to be delinquent in the performance of their sol-
emn engagements; whereas its policy is to compel observance of
them."218 While this view may reflect a Western disposition to re-
gard one's word as one's bond, traditional contract theory holds
that in the interest of economic efficiency, persons should be able
to breach their contracts as long as they pay damages.1 9 The tradi-
tional theory makes sense only on the assumption that the vast
majority of contracts will be honored and that breach is an aberra-
tion. If the premise were reversed, society could not function, so
the court is right that there is value in deterrence lest breach be-
come more frequent.
But the court's view could promote the nonperformance it in-
tends to deter. If A, a contractor, came to B early on in perform-
ance and said, "I'm not sure I'm going to be able to finish my per-
formance," B's entreaties to perform would fall on deaf ears if A
knew that the further performance would become a gift to B. In
short, A would have an incentive to quit performance at the earli-
est possible sign of trouble rather than attempt full performance.
B. Application to Contract for Deed
The doctrine of restitution for a party in breach could assist in
resolving the thorny problems that arise from forfeiture under a
contract for deed.20 Under the standard contract for deed, on
breach by purchaser, seller takes possession and keeps all pay-
ments made as liquidated damages. Seller thereby also recaptures
the equity acquired by purchaser through principal payments and
appreciation. This could result in a harsh forfeiture which a court
may wish to prevent. For example, P contracts to purchase a house
from S for $60,000, payable $10,000 down and $50,000 on contract
at ten percent over twenty-five years. After five years, when P has
made payments totaling over $37,000, P defaults. S repossesses,
218. Horpestad, 184 Mont. at 486, 603 P.2d at 1048 (quoting Waite v. C. E. Shoe-
maker & Co., 50 Mont. 264, 278, 146 P. 736, 739 (1915)). In Waite, the expectancy damages
exceeded the restitution requested by plaintiff, so the principle would not be applied.
219. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, at 101-02 (1981).
220. See Comment, The Default Clause in the Installment Land Contract, 42 MONT.
L. REV. 110, 121-22 (1981).
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keeps all payments made, and sells the house for its present value,
$90,000. Even after deductions are made for the rental value, any
inflation factor, and all of S's expenses, S has still profited consid-
erably from the breach. Under these circumstances, a court could
reject the liquidated damages provision as a penalty and honor
purchaser's demand for restitution of monies paid in excess of
seller's damages.22
This principle has been recognized in Montana. In Cook-
Reynolds Co. v. Chipman,222 defendant defaulted on a contract for
deed but sought to return the property in exchange for the return
of payments made less deductions for the use of the property and
damages. The trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff. On appeal,
the court reversed, holding that
as a matter of fact the actual damages sustained by the vendor in
this case are less in amount than the moneys paid by the pur-
chaser, and if ... the vendor can retain the excess, then most
assuredly the purchaser will have incurred a loss in the nature of
a forfeiture authorized by the terms of the contract, by reason of
his failure to comply with the same.2"'
The court invoked the anti-forfeiture statute224 to relieve plaintiff
of his forfeiture, finding that his failure to make payments was not
negligent, willful, or fraudulent. 2 5 In fact, defendant had at-
tempted to continue performance even in the face of default, alleg-
edly at plaintiff's urging, and those payments only increased his
loss on default.
The principle of restitution stated so firmly in Cook-Reynolds
was gradually eroded until it was fully swept away by Estabrook v.
Sonstelie,2 2 6 which made clear that a forfeiture should be relieved
not by payment of all damages, as in Cook-Reynolds, but by pay-
ment in full under the contract. Where there is an acceleration
221. While it has not yet directly confronted a harsh forfeiture, the court seems to
favor the seller's demand for specific performance to other remedies on default. See SAS
Partnership v. Schafer,__ Mont. -, 653 P.2d 834 (1982). If the seller seeks this remedy
and does not resell the property, the buyer may not be entitled to restitution. RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 374 illustration 1 (1981).
222. 47 Mont. 289, 133 P. 694 (1913).
223. Id. at 300, 133 P. at 698.
224. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-1-104 (1983) provides:
Whenever by the terms of an obligation a party thereto incurs a forfeiture or a
loss in the nature of a forfeiture by reason of his failure to comply with its provi-
sions, he may be relieved therefrom upon making full compensation to the other
party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of duty.
225. Cook-Reynolds, 47 Mont. at 302-03, 133 P. at 698-99.
226. 86 Mont. 435, 284 P. 147 (1930).
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clause, this would mean payment of the full contract price.2 7 The
court noted that this was the interpretation given the same statute
in California.2 8
Yet California later changed its view. In Freedman v. Rector,
Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 9 plaintiff pur-
chased property for $18,000, paying $2000 down with the balance
to be paid later. On plaintiff's default, defendant sold the property
for $20,000. Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, recognized
that since defendant had not suffered a loss from the breach, al-
lowing it to keep the down payment as damages would be to en-
force a penalty. Under earlier California cases, 30 courts had in-
voked the equivalent of the Montana anti-forfeiture statute to
allow plaintiffs to recover payments made. But in those cases, the
breach had been found not to be willful, so the anti-forfeiture stat-
ute permitted relief for the purchaser. Justice Traynor had to find
an independent basis for recovery for a willfully breaching party.
He recognized the illogic of a penalty that becomes more severe as
the performing party comes closer to full performance:
If a penalty were to be imposed it should bear some rational rela-
tionship to its purpose. A penalty equal to the net benefits con-
ferred by part performance bears no such relationship. It not only
fails to take into consideration the degree of culpability, but its
severity increases as the seriousness of the breach decreases. Thus
a vendee who breaches his contract before he has benefited the
vendor by part performance suffers no penalty, whereas one who
has almost completely performed his contract suffers the maxi-
mum penalty."s1
Imposition of a penalty is inconsistent with the prohibition on pu-
nitive damages in contract actions28 2 and with the requirement
that liquidated damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual
damages.2 3 3 Therefore, Justice Traynor reasoned, the damages in
Freedman were neither compensatory nor enforceable as liqui-
dated damages. They therefore must be punitive. The court then
awarded restitution of the $2000 in order to avoid the imposition
227. See, e.g., Parrott v. Heller, 171 Mont. 212, 557 P.2d 819 (1976); SAS Partnership
v. Schafer, - Mont. -, 653 P.2d 834 (1982).
228. Estabrook, 86 Mont. at 440, 284 P. at 149.
229. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
230. Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949); Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d
36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950).
231. Freedman, 37 Cal. 2d at 20, 230 P.2d at 632.
232. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983). See Burnham, supra note 9, at 45-46.
233. MONTr. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (1983). See Burnham, supra note 9, at 41-44.
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of punitive damages.2"
The doctrine of restitution for a breaching purchaser has been
firmly established in California. In Bensinger v. Davidson,88 pur-
chaser under a contract for deed defaulted after making a down
payment of $10,000 and monthly payments of $17,200. For pur-
poses of deciding whether purchaser had a claim to which a federal
tax lien would attach, the court held that purchaser had a claim
under California law for unjust enrichment."' After deducting the
fair rental value and expenses occasioned by the sale and default
from the $17,200 paid, the court found unjust enrichment in the
amount of $1639."' This principle was recognized in Montana in
Greenup v. United States,'28 in which Judge Jameson held that
the government in enforcing a tax lien "should be given an oppor-
tunity to allege and prove the amount of any unjust
enrichment."'
While courts make passing reference to the significance of will-
ful breach, in fact the distinction between willful and non-willful
breach is rarely the basis for decision.240 The determination is so
subjective as to justify Corbin's characterization of "emotional. 24 1
And it is unfair. The moral quality of the breaching party's behav-
ior does not alter the benefit the non-breaching party has re-
ceived. 2 Under broad principles of restitution, that party should
pay for the benefit conferred.4 In an article advocating restitution
for breach of a contract for deed, Corbin established principles by
which courts can decide objectively whether restitution is
appropriate:
The cases denying restitution can ... be justified on one or more
of the following grounds:
234. Freedman, 37 Cal. 2d at 21, 230 P.2d at 633.
235. 147 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
236. The court stated that "we think the California cases rest on the principle of 'un-
just enrichment' and the policy of the law against forfeitures." Id. at 247. The California
statutes construed in those cases all have Montana counterparts.
237. Id. at 249.
238. 239 F. Supp. 330 (D. Mont. 1965).
239. Id. at 333.
240. One of the most famous statements is that of Justice Cardozo in Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 244, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921), rearg denied, 230 N.Y. 656, 130
N.E. 933 (1921): "The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of his transgression." Yet
when defendant moved for reargument on the grounds that in this instance plaintiff had not
performed as agreed, the court stated that the express condition had not been materially
breached.
241. See supra note 215.
242. A fine discussion of this issue may be found in Nordstrom & Woodland, supra
note 202, at 211-14.
243. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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(1) The defendant has not rescinded and remains ready and will-
ing to perform, and still has a right to specific performance by the
vendee; (2) the plaintiff has not shown that the injury caused by
his breach is less than the instalments received by the defendant;
(3) there is an express provision that the money may be retained
by the vendor and the facts are such as to make this a genuine
provision for liquidated damages, and not one for a penalty or
forfeiture. If the facts are such that none of these justifications
exists, restitution should be allowed.244
VIII. RESTITUTION UNDER ILLEGAL CONTRACTS
The fundamental principle of restitution is that absent special
circumstances a party ought to be compensated for benefits con-
ferred. 246 This principle has been extended to give restitution to a
breaching party.246 But does the principle extend to restitution for
performance under an illegal contract?
The general rule is that there is no recovery.2 47 In McPartlin v.
Fransen,24e the trial court, having found illegal an agreement to
transfer a radio station license without consent of the Federal
Communications Commission, ordered an allocation of payments
between the parties. On appeal, the court reversed, stating that
"the law, in short, will not aid either party to an illegal agreement.
It leaves the parties where it finds them. 2 49
The rule stated in McPartlin must be applied flexibly, for
leaving the parties where they are could render injustice, especially
if one of the parties is not a wrongdoer.2 5 In Builders Supply Co.
v. City of Helena,2 5 plaintiff entered into a contract with the
mayor of Helena to supply the city with $20,920 worth of water
pipe. By billing for lots of less than $500, the parties evaded the
bid laws which applied only to contracts in excess of $500.25 The
city paid all but $6271 before the deal was scrutinized. Plaintiff
244. Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments
Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013, 1032-33 (1931).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
247. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1164 (1970).
248. - Mont. - , 648 P.2d 729 (1982).
249. Id. at __, 648 P.2d at 731 (quoting authorities cited in McManus v. Fulton, 85
Mont. 170, 182-83, 278 P. 126, 131 (1929)).
250. 2 G. PALMER, RESTITUTION § 814.
251. 116 Mont. 368, 154 P.2d 270 (1944).
252. The laws concerning municipal contracts are now found in MONT. CODE ANN. §§
7-5-4301 to -4309 (1983). Plaintiff's argument in Builders Supply that the multiple
purchases were not a violation of the statute would now be foreclosed by MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 7-5-4305 (1983), which was adopted in 1947.
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acknowledged that the agreement was illegal and therefore void,
but sought the $6271 in restitution. The court cited the general
rule in cases of illegal contracts that the courts will not assist the
parties but will leave them where they are.25" The court neverthe-
less reasoned that specific restitution-return of the actual prop-
erty-would be appropriate where possible, but buried pipe need
not be dug up and the reasonable value need not be paid."
Restoration of the property is a more generous remedy than
many courts have allowed in similar circumstances, for it contra-
dicts the rule that the courthouse door is closed to transgressors.
Although the court did not so distinguish it, Builders Supply
could fall under the exception to the general rule that arises when
refusal to enforce an illegal agreement could frustrate the policy
that refusal is designed to serve. 5" For example, if the city had
paid more than the price for which the city could have purchased
the pipe, it would not serve the public if the courthouse door was
closed to the city's attempt to recover the overcharge. 57
In dicta, the court recognized that restoration of the unused
property and acceptance of the balance at the contract price would
defeat the purpose of the bid statute, which is to insure that goods
are purchased at the lowest price. The court stated that if the
property was available for return, the city would have to restore
only an amount which, added to the payments made, would equal
the price for which the city could have purchased the pipe.258 This
is an application of the principle that when restitution is de-
manded by a breaching party, the measure of the recovery is the
benefit to the non-breaching party."
Restitution was also allowed under an illegal contract in Larry
C. Iverson, Inc. v. Bouma.2 e° Plaintiff corporation sold a farm on a
contract for deed to defendants when the officers of the corpora-
tion did not have authority to authorize the sale. " 1 The sale was
253. Builders Supply, 116 Mont. at 378, 154 P.2d at 274.
254. Id.
255. McManus, 85 Mont. at 182-83, 278 P. at 131.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 197 (1981).
257. In Grady v. City of Livingston, 115 Mont. 47, 141 P.2d 346 (1943), a closely-
divided court denied a taxpayers' suit in similar circumstances.
258. Builders Supply, 116 Mont. at 385, 154 P.2d at 277.
259. See supra text accompanying note 204. Here, the city had made payments of
$14,649 for pipe which it could have obtained for $15,453. If the pipe had been available for
return to plaintiff, the city would have had to return only $804 worth ($15,453 - $14,649). Id.
at 385, 154 P.2d at 277.
260. - Mont. - , 639 P.2d 47 (1982).
261. The officers violated MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-908 and 15-909 (1947), which
were repealed when Montana adopted the Montana Business Corporation Act, MONT. CODE
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voided by the trial court, which restored the farm to the newly
reconstituted corporation and made various adjustments between
the parties. Defendants were allowed two-thirds of each crop har-
vested and the value of improvements to the property, but were
denied income from mineral rights. On appeal, the corporation
urged that defendants should not be allowed to keep their gains
under an illegal contract, but the court upheld the award of the
crop share "if for no other reason than it was fair and equita-
ble. 2 62 The court also reduced the award for improvements from
their value to their cost. As a general rule a party is not entitled to
restitution for improvements in these circumstances, for the en-
richment is not unjust where the party makes the improvements
with knowledge of its questionable title, but the court awarded the
cost in equity and because plaintiff in its pleadings sought limita-
tion of recovery to cost."' The gas and oil income was denied, for
defendants lacked authority to enter contracts exploiting land they
wrongfully possessed.2
In McPartlin, the performance of the agreement was illegal. In
that instance a court may readily find that it will not intercede
where the public is not affected. But in Larry C. Iverson, Inc., the
performance itself was not illegal but occurred under a contract
illegally obtained. Courts have had difficulty deciding whether to
allow restitution in this situation. For example, if an agent of seller
bribes a purchaser to order goods, is purchaser excused from pay-
ing for the goods?2 65 Perhaps where there is an independent sanc-
tion against illegally obtaining the agreement, such as criminal
penalties for bribery, restitution should be allowed. But if there is
no sanction against obtaining the contract illegally, as in a share-
holders' derivative suit, refusal to allow the wrongdoers to obtain
the fruits of the illegal act may be appropriate.
IX. CONCLUSION
The theory of contract damages is designed to achieve maxi-
mum economic efficiency. In this theoretical model, a party is
under no compulsion to perform. The only consequence of breach
is that damages become payable. A party therefore contemplates
breach with the goal of minimizing economic loss, asking whether
ANN. §§ 35-1-101 to -1306 (1983).
262. Larry C. Iverson, Inc., - Mont. at -, 639 P.2d at 61.
263. Id.
264. Id. at -, 639 P.2d at 61-62.
265. See, e.g., Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, 124 A.D. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830 (1908)
(no restitution for goods sold under a kickback scheme).
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breach will cost more than performance, and acting in accordance
with the answer.2 6
For example, A agrees to build a house for B for $50,000. A
begins performance and when half the house is built, A has spent
$25,000, which B has paid. A predicts that complete performance
will cost $50,000; A will be paid $50,000 by B, but will realize no
profit. To predict the cost of breach, A estimates the losses paya-
ble. B will be entitled to the expectancy: what B would have had if
the contract had been performed. If C can complete for $28,000, B
must pay C $28,000 and A $22,000 to obtain the expectancy: a
house for $50,000. Since B has paid A $25,000, B may recover
$3000 from A to achieve this result.2 67
Having predicted the losses payable on breach, A will then de-
termine the gains realizable. These might include alternative prof-
itable projects and more efficient use of capital. If the gains exceed
the damages payable to B, breach will benefit A and will not harm
B. For example, if A can earn a profit of $5000 on another project,
A can pay B the $3000 occasioned by the breach and still net
$2000. Efficient distribution of economic effort will have been
facilitated."'
A's decision-making will be facilitated by the rules governing
the extent of damages recoverable. A must decide whether, in ad-
dition to liability for B's loss of the "benefit of the bargain," there
will be additional liability for consequential damages. The rule of
foreseeability, in stating that B may recover only the losses which
A could have foreseen at the time of contracting, allows A to factor
in those losses when contemplating breach.269 The rule of certainty
limits B's proof to insure that B does not benefit from the
breach.27 0 The rule of avoidable consequences prevents B from re-
covering losses that could have been prevented.2 71 Alternatively,
the parties might have liquidated the damages for breach. These
damages will also be limited, for the clause will not be enforced if
266. The classic statement of this viewpoint is found in Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HAv. L. REv. 457, 462 (1897): "Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas
more manifest than in the law of contract .... The duty to keep a contract at common law
means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else."
267. The example assumes restitution for a breaching party. The issue is usually
mooted by progress payments.
268. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs, ch. 16, at 100 (1981) states the theory with
less than a ringing endorsement: "This traditional response is not without its shortcomings.
... However, the main thrust of the preceding economic analysis lends some support to
traditional contract doctrine in this area."
269. See Burnham, supra note 9, at 4-11.
270. Id. at 11-18.
271. Id. at 18-20.
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it is too far removed from the actual damages. 7 2 Finally, the award
of transaction costs-the expenses incurred by the non-breaching
party in resolving the dispute, such as attorneys' fees, expenses,
and loss of use of money-will be restricted to amounts below ac-
tual cost.2 T"
The thesis of a previous article was that the transaction costs
are so significant that the scheme does not function according to
the theoretical model.27 Because of the limitations on proof, on
the extent of damages, on recoverable costs, and on collection, the
award of damages will in fact not compensate the non-breaching
party. Knowing this, the breaching party may manipulate the situ-
ation. For example, A may offer B $1000 to satisfy the $3000 claim.
If B's estimated transaction costs exceed $2000, as a rational eco-
nomic person B will accept the offer. B has not received the expec-
tancy and A has benefited from the breach. Various reforms were
suggested to redress this imbalance.2 75
Courts have not been unmindful of this problem, but the solu-
tions have generally addressed not the transaction costs, which are
often dictated by statute, 2 7 but other assumptions of the economic
model.2 In addition to zero transaction costs, the economic model
assumes that compelling performance of obligations is not a goal of
contract law, that the motive for or "willfulness" of breach is not
significant, and that punitive damages are not appropriate for
breach of contract.2 78
There is, however, a tension between the constraints of the
traditional model and the reality of the fact situations seen every
day in the courtroom where compensation for loss does not occur.
Faced with the inadequacy of the remedial system, it is no wonder
that judges occasionally attempt to compel the performance of ob-
ligations, emphasize the willfulness of breach, or find punitive
damages appropriate. It is the reversal of such traditional contract
constructs that has led at least one writer to predict "The Death of
Contract, ' 27 9 with compensation for the breach of voluntary obliga-
272. Id. at 41-43.
273. Id. at 44-47.
274. Id. passim.
275. Id. at 50-51.
276. Id. at 44-49.
277. There are exceptions. In Foy v. Anderson, 176 Mont. 507, 580 P.2d 114 (1978),
the court affirmed an award of attorneys' fees in the absence of statutory authority or agree-
ment of the parties in order to minimize the transaction costs of the defendant.
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CONRACTS ch. 16, at 100 (1981). The economic model
also presumes money damages is an adequate substitute for specific performance.
279. G. GIMoRE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
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tions merging with the tort system.8 0 The undesirability of this
practice is not that contract should be kept free of "foreign" influ-
ences, but that no doctrine should be applied on an ad hoc basis.
Before resorting to such measures, attorneys and courts should
recognize the wealth of possibilities available in the principles of
reliance and restitution. The conservatizing measures of the expec-
tation interest should give way to the reliance and restitution in-
terests when remedies serving those interests would fully compen-
sate a party. Restitution has long been a stepchild of the law,
slipping through the cracks of the curriculum, unrecognized in the
statutes, neglected in the digests. Yet the doctrine has developed
sufficient flexibility along with sufficient particularity to guide its
application in most situations. Greater recognition of these doc-
trines, along with modern liberal pleading, may assist attorneys
and courts in achieving a more satisfactory system of damages in
contract actions.
280. See supra note 10.
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